Negative externalities in cropping decisions: private versus common land by Benito Ostolaza, Juan Miguel et al.
 Departamento de Economía 
 
Ekonomia Saila 
Documentos de Trabajo 
 
Lan Gaiak 
NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES IN CROPPING DECISIONS: 
PRIVATE VERSUS COMMON LAND 
Juan Miguel Benito-Ostolaza 
Roberto Ezcurra 
Nuria Osés-Eraso 
D.T. 1311 
Negative externalities in cropping decisions:
Private versus common land∗
J.M. Benito-Ostolaza, R. Ezcurra and N. Ose´s-Eraso
Department of Economics
Universidad Pu´blica de Navarra
November 11, 2013
Abstract
This paper analyzes to what extent the definition of property rights affects crop-
ping decisions when these decisions generate negative externalities. To that end,
we implement an experimental study where agents make cropping decisions in two
different treatments: private and common land. The results show that there are no
statistically significant differences between the two treatments in the contribution
to the negative externality, thus revealing that the definition of property rights does
not affect cropping decision in this context. Furthermore, our findings indicate that
the implication of the agents in activities generating negative externalities tends to
increase over time, thus amplifying its adverse consequences.
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1 Introduction
Two solutions have traditionally been proposed to address the problem of externalities
described in the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968): the establishment of a coer-
cive power and the imposition of private property rights. Although there are exceptions
(Ostrom, 1990), privatization and government ownership have been usually considered
as panaceas for solving the problem of the commons. Nevertheless, some studies have
remarked that in socio-ecological systems there are no one-size-fits-all solutions (Os-
trom, 2007; Ostrom et al., 2007; Ostrom et al., 2010). The problems of overuse and
destruction of natural resources are diverse and involve many different variables (bio-
logical, economic, social) and it is therefore complicated to find a single solution. Each
situation requires its own diagnosis and its own solution.
An extensive literature has examined the impact of different factors on the exploita-
tion of common property resources, including monitoring and sanctioning (Ostrom et
al. 1992; Casari and Plott, 2003), information and payoff structures (Apestegu´ıa, 2006),
resource scarcity (Ose´s-Eraso and Viladrich-Grau, 2007; Ose´s-Eraso et al., 2008), among
many others. However, despite the fact that private property has been proposed as a
general solution to the problem of the commons, the testing of this hypothesis using
experiments has received scarce attention in the literature. Some experimental studies
have analyzed the effect that the definition of property rights may have on the behavior
of the agents. Cox et al. (2009), for example, analyzed a trust game where initial en-
dowment can be private or common property. They found that endowments which are
induced as common property lead to marginally greater cooperation or trust, in con-
trast to what most scholars would expect. However, Cox and Hall (2010) showed that
cooperation is lower in common property trust games when property right entitlements
are strengthened. There are also cases of natural resources that have been privatized.
For example, Grafton et al. (2000) examined the effects of privatization on the British
Columbia halibut fishery, paying particular attention to the resources features that are
key to improving the degree of efficiency.
The definition of property rights is particularly relevant in land exploitation. Farm-
land can be exploited under common property or under private property and in both
situations cropping decisions may generate negative externalities. This is the case in
contexts where externalities are related to the use of pesticides (Wilson and Tisdell,
2001), or to the occurrence of diseases due to the specialization in certain crops (Weitz-
man, 2000). In such cases, the externality does not know of property rights: farmers
who adopt biological pest control strategies on their private land will be affected due to
externalities of pesticides arising from neighboring holdings (Wilson and Tisdell, 2001),
whereas farmers centered on relatively few high-yield crops encourage the development
of more crop-specific parasites globally (Weitzman, 2000), regardless if the land is private
or common. In addition, farmers who do not use pesticides or do not plant a specific
crop may be forced to do so to avoid economic losses, thus amplifying the negative
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externality.
Against this background, this paper aims to examine whether the definition of prop-
erty rights affects cropping decisions when these decisions generate negative externalities.
To that end, we develop an experimental study where agents face cropping decisions in
two different settings. In the first setting property rights are individually/privately de-
fined (private land treatment), whereas in the second setting property rights fall on a
well-defined community of users (common land treatment). This change in the defini-
tion of property rights does not modify the negative externality associated with cropping
decisions; it simply modifies the context in which it develops. In the private land treat-
ment, each player has her own plot of land, while in the common land treatment all
players share a plot of land. In the two treatments agents face the same cropping deci-
sions. In particular, they must choose between two alternative projects (i.e. crops) A
and B. Project A represents externalities due to the use of pesticides or due to diseases
related to crop specialization, whereas project B is free of externalities. Investment in
project A is individually optimal but not socially optimal.
Our experimental design is based on Andreoni (1995) and on Ose´s-Eraso and Vila-
drich-Grau (2007). The first study analyzed cooperation in a framework of negative
externalities against a framework of positive externalities, while the second modified
Andreoni’s design to study the appropriation of common resources. We slightly modify
Andreoni’s negative framework for our private land treatment and take the Ose´s-Eraso
and Viladrich-Grau’s equivalent design for our common land treatment.
In our analysis we pay particular attention to the potential impact on the results
of the existence of differences in the subjects’ preferences. For this reason, in both
treatments cropping decisions are taken in two different contexts, a conditional context
and a simultaneous context. In the former, each agent knows the cropping decision of
others before making her own decision. In the latter, all agents make cropping decisions
simultaneously and repeatedly, using only the information provided by past cropping
decisions. The conditional context is based on Fischbacher et al. (2001), who applied a
variant of the so-called “strategy method” (Selten, 1967) to draw out agents’ preferences.
The experimental results show that the definition of property rights does not affect
cropping decisions in this context. This suggests that privatization can not be considered
a panacea to address the problem of negative externalities in the exploitation of common
property resources. In addition, the implication of agents in crops that generate negative
externalities tends to increase over time. The results also indicate that the preferences
shown in the conditional context are one of the determinants of the agents’ behavior in
the simultaneous context. Preferences do not seem to change with the experience gained
from repeating the game.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical framework
of the private land game and the common land game. Section 3 describes the experi-
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mental design and procedure. Section 4 shows the main experimental results. Finally,
conclusions and future research are presented in section 5.
2 The games
2.1 Private land treatment
Assume n landowners each of whom has a plot of potential value P . The final value of
the plot depends on cropping decisions. Each landowner has an endowment e to make
cropping decisions. Two different crops are available: crop or project A and crop or
project B. Each endowment point invested in crop A returns m points to the landowner
but reduces the landowner’s plot value and the other landowners’ plot value by α points.
In turn, each endowment point invested in crop B returns w points to the landowner
and has no additional impact on individual plots. In the rest of the paper, we refer to
investment in crop A as contribution to the negative externality.
Each landowner invests her entire endowment between the two types of crops. Let xi
be the part of the endowment invested in crop A by landowner i, that is, contribution to
the negative externality. In turn, (e−xi) is agent i’s investment in crop B. The individual
plot value after the cropping decisions of all landowners is PF = P − α
∑n
i=1 xi. The
game payoff for landowner i after the cropping decisions, pii, is the sum of the return
from her investment in crop A, the return from her investment in crop B and the plot
value.
pii = mxi + w(e− xi) + P − α
n∑
i=1
xi
where m− nα < w < m− α. That is, for each landowner the marginal net return from
crop A is greater than the marginal net return from crop B, m− α > w. Likewise, the
marginal net return for all landowners from crop A is smaller than the marginal net
return for all landowners from crop B, m − αn < w. Therefore, the game represents a
social dilemma where individually optimal decisions are not socially optimal. As can be
checked, the Nash solution is the full contribution to the negative externality, xi = e,
while the efficient solution is xi = 0.
2.2 Common land treatment
Assume n landowners share a plot of potential value C. The final value of the plot
depends on cropping decisions. Each landowner has an endowment e to make cropping
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decisions. Two different crops are available: crop or project A and crop or project B.
Each endowment point invested in crop A returns m points to the landowner but reduces
the common plot value by β points. In turn, each endowment point invested in crop B
returns w points to the landowner and has no additional impact on the common plot.
As in the previous case, investment in crop A stands for contribution to the negative
externality.
Each landowner invests her entire endowment between the two types of crops. Let xi
be the part of the endowment invested in crop A by landowner i, that is, the contribution
to the negative externality. In turn, (e − xi) is agent i’s investment in crop B. The
common plot value after the cropping decisions of all landowners is CF = C−β
∑n
i=1 xi.
We assume that this final value is equally distributed among the landowners. Therefore,
the game payoff for landowner i after the cropping decisions, pii, is the sum of the return
from her investment in crop A, the return from her investment in crop B and the equal
share in the final value of the common plot.
pii = mxi + w(e− xi) + C − β
∑n
i=1 xi
n
where m − β < w < m − βn . That is, for each landowner the marginal net return from
crop A is greater than the marginal net return from crop B, m − βn > w. Similarly,
the marginal net return for all landowners from crop A is smaller than the marginal
net return for all landowners from crop B, m− β < w. Therefore, the game represents
a social dilemma where individually optimal decisions are not socially optimal. As in
the private land treatment, the Nash solution is the full contribution to the negative
externality, xi = e, while the efficient solution is xi = 0.
Table 1 summarizes the main parameters describing the games presented above.
Notice that both games are equivalent if β = nα and C = nP .
Table 1: Cropping decisions: private vs. common land
Private land Common land
Land total value nP C
Individual marginal benefit from A m− α m− βn
Individual marginal benefit from B w w
Social marginal benefit from A m− nα m− β
Social marginal benefit from B w w
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3 Experimental design and procedure
The experiments reported in this study were conducted using the z-tree program (Fis-
chbacher, 1999) in the computer rooms of the Universidad Pu´blica de Navarra in De-
cember 2012. The subjects that participated in the experiments were undergraduate
students from the university. In all, 60 undergraduate students aged 17 to 27 years
participated in the different experimental sessions. They included 37 females and 23
males.
The parametrization of the two games is summarized in Table 2. Groups of four
members played each game. The endowment was 20 points. The return from crop A
was 3 points, while the return from crop B was 1 point. The external cost from crop A
was 1 point in the private land treatment and 4 points in the common land treatment.
The plot value was 80 points in the private land treatment and 360 in the common land
treatment. Observe that we implemented equivalent games. Furthermore, the plot value
after cropping decisions was zero when all subjects followed the Nash strategy.
Table 2: Treatments’ parametrization
Parameter Private land Common land
n 4 4
e 20 20
P 80 —
C — 360
w 1 1
m 3 3
α 1 —
β — 4
We ran two different sessions, one per treatment. There were 32 participants in the
private land treatment and 28 participants in the common land treatment. Each game
was played in two different contexts: a conditional context and a simultaneous context.
In the conditional context, subjects had to decide their contribution to the negative
externality (investment in crop A) knowing beforehand the contribution to the negative
externality of the other members of the group. Each subject had to complete a table,
the conditional contribution table with 21 different situations, ranging from no contri-
bution to the negative externality of the others to full contribution. In the simultaneous
context, subjects were randomly divided into matching groups of four members and the
composition of the groups remained unchanged for the whole session. The actual com-
position of the groups was not known by the participants. Subjects made crop decisions
simultaneously without knowing the decisions of the others. The game was repeated
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for ten rounds. After each round, participants received information about their own
contribution decisions, the contribution decisions of the others, the final plot value and
their earnings from the round.
The subject’s payoff was calculated as follows: in the conditional context, ten deci-
sions were randomly selected and the subject received the corresponding payoff. In the
simultaneous context, the payoff was the sum of the gains in each round.
After reading the instructions, the participants had to answer a comprehension test.1
Before beginning the experiment, all the answers were checked to make sure that the
participants had understood the structure of the games. The subjects were told that,
at the end of the experiment, the points would be exchanged for cash at a prespecified
exchange rate. Each session lasted around one hour and the average earnings per subject
amounted to about 15 Euros.
4 Results
4.1 Conditional contribution
The information provided by the conditional contribution table can be used to draw out
the subjects’ preferences (Fischbacher et al., 2001). To that end, the different individuals
were classified into four categories defined as follows:
• Nash players: Subjects who choose the highest level of contribution (xi = 20) in
at least 60% of the situations.
• Social players: Subjects who choose the lowest level of contribution (xi = 0) in at
least 60% of the situations.
• Conditional players: Subjects with a correlation coefficient between their own and
others’s contribution that is statistically significant at the 5% level.
• Other players: Subjects who cannot be classified in any of the categories defined
above.
Figure 1 summarizes the results obtained when these four categories are used to
classify the individuals in the two treatments considered. As can be observed, in both
treatments the participants are characterized by having heterogeneous preferences in re-
lation to their contribution decisions, which should be taken into account when analyzing
1The instructions and the comprehension test are available from the authors upon request.
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the results in the simultaneous setting. In particular, the decisions of a significant per-
centage of subjects in the two treatments were different from those predicted by standard
economic theory assuming rational and selfish individuals. These findings are consistent
with the results obtained in numerous experiments (e.g. Leyard, 1995; Fischbacher et
al., 2001). Specifically, it is worth noting the high percentage of individuals classified as
conditional players in the common land treatment. This may be related to the greater
relevance of group identity when sharing resource property (Kramer and Brewer, 1984;
Dawes et al., 1988).
Figure 1: Subjects’ classification based on the conditional contribution table.
4.2 Simultaneous contribution
We now focus our attention on the setting in which cropping decisions are made simul-
taneously. To that end, we begin by examining the density functions of the distribution
of the contribution decisions when the land is private property and when the land is
common property. We address this issue by means of non-parametric techniques, thus
avoiding the lack of generality and flexibility associated with parametric methods. The
non-parametric approach does not require specifying any particular functional form be-
forehand, though a method to smooth the data must be selected. An immediate option
is to use histograms, the oldest and best-known non-parametric density function esti-
mator (Stangor, 2011). Histograms are useful to describe certain data characteristic,
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but they present several limitations.2 For this reason, in our analysis we complement
the information provided by histograms with a kernel density estimator, which has the
advantage of being independent of the choice of origin (corresponding to the location of
the bins in a histogram) (Wand and Jones, 1995).3
Figure 2: Histograms and kernel density estimates.
Figure 2 shows the results obtained when these non-parametric methods are used
to estimate the density functions of the distribution of the contribution decisions in the
two treatments. As can be seen, the external shape of the distribution is very similar
when the land is private property and when the land is common property, regardless of
the round considered. In order to confirm this visual impression, we performed several
two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of equality of distributions.4 Table 3 reveals
that the results of these tests do not allow us to reject the null hypothesis of equality
of distributions in any case, thus confirming that there are no statistically significant
differences in contributions to the negative externality between private and common
2For example, the problem of how to define the origin and length of each interval, and the possibility
of improving the accuracy and efficiency of the estimates (Silverman, 1986).
3Specifically, the Epanechnikov kernel function was used, while the smoothing parameter was deter-
mined according to Silverman (1986, p.48).
4Given the relatively reduced sample size, the p-values of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test were obtained
by modifying the asymptotic p-value by using a numerical approximation technique.
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land. This result shows that the definition of property rights does not significantly
affect cropping decisions. Accordingly, privatization cannot be considered a universal
solution to address the problem of externalities in the exploitation of common property
resources, which is consistent with the evidence provided by Ostrom (2007) and Ostrom
and Cox (2010), among others.
Table 3: Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests.
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
Round 1 0.076 1.000 Round 6 0.161 0.767
Round 2 0.196 0.515 Round 7 0.080 1.000
Round 3 0.201 0.485 Round 8 0.076 1.000
Round 4 0.128 0.901 Round 9 0.107 0.991
Round 5 0.196 0.515 Round 10 0.143 0.878
Figure 2 also shows that contributions to the negative externality are relatively high
in both treatments. Nevertheless, this does not imply that the initial situation remained
stable over time. In particular, regardless of the treatment considered, our estimates
reveal that the density located at the upper end of the distribution increased throughout
the various rounds, thus indicating that the contribution to negative externality tends
to raise over time. This pattern is illustrated in the average contributions shown in
Figure 3. In fact, the increasing tendency observed in the levels of average contribution
is consistent with the results obtained when fitting a simple time trend by least-squares.
This result suggests that the implication of the agents in activities generating negative
externalities increases over time, thus amplifying its adverse consequences.
At this point it should be recalled that the information provided by the conditional
contribution table shows that subjects are heterogeneous (Figure 1). Accordingly, it is
important to investigate to what extent the crop decisions vary in the different individual
typologies identified previously. To that end, Figure 4 displays the average contribution
in the four categories distinguished above: Nash players, social players, conditional
players and other players. As can be observed in Table 4, the Kruskal-Wallis rank
tests reveal the existence in the two treatments of statistically significant differences in
the levels of average contribution among the various groups. This shows that subjects
preferences do not seem to change with the experience gained from repeating the game,
thus confirming the relevance of the classification proposed in the previous section.
Furthermore, Figure 4 also shows that each category is characterized by a different
behavior, regardless of the treatment considered. Thus, Nash players choose the highest
levels of contribution when the land is private property or common property, and their
decisions do not change significantly over time. By contrast, social players register the
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Figure 3: Average contribution.
lowest levels of contribution, but only when the land is common property.5 In turn, the
conditional players are characterized by an intermediate level of contribution during the
first rounds, which tends to increase over time. Finally, other players show a medium
level of contribution that remains relatively stable throughout the different rounds.
Table 4: Kruskal-Wallis rank tests.
Treatment Private land Common land
Chi-squared 17.435 30.432
p-value 0.001 0.000
In order to complete these results, we now examine the determinants of individual
contribution to the negative externality through a regression analysis. Our dependent
variable is the contribution of subject i in group j during round t, xjit. As explanatory
variables we include the contribution of the remaining members of the group in the
previous round. Additionally, we investigate whether the fact of being above or below the
group average may influence subsequent decisions. To investigate this issue, we define the
following variables (Ose´s-Eraso and Viladrich-Grau, 2011): above average contribution,
AAjit = max{(xjit − x¯jt ), 0}; and below average contribution, BAjit = max{(x¯jt − xjit), 0}
5This results should be treated with some caution due to reduced number of subjects included in this
category (Figure 1).
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Figure 4: Average contribution in the various categories.
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where x¯jt is the average contribution of group j in round t. Furthermore, we include
three dummy variables to identify Nash players, social players and conditional players
according to the classification proposed in section 4.1. Likewise, an additional dummy
variable is also added to distinguish between private and common property land. Finally,
in order to investigate whether individual contributions are affected by the evolution of
time, the model incorporates time-specific effects common to all subjects.
Together with the decision of which explanatory variables to include in the analysis,
we have several estimation strategies to choose among. Given that our dataset has the
characteristics of panel data, in principle we could resort to a fixed effects model or a
random effects model. Faced with this quandary, we opted to estimate a random effects
model for two reasons. First, as pointed out by Greene (1993, p.479) and Wooldridge
(2002, p.247), the random effects model is more appropriate than the fixed effects model
when the unobserved effects are uncorrelated with the control variables. In our case,
the estimated correlation between the unobserved effects and the explanatory variables
is relatively low (ρ = 0.084), which suggests that the random effects model is preferable
in this case. Second, the random effects model makes it possible to estimate all the
parameters of the model, whereas the fixed effects model only allows us to estimate
the parameter of the time-varying variables. This is particularly important in our con-
text, since we are especially interested in determining the effect of the different dummy
variables defined above on individual contributions.
Table 5 shows the results obtained when different versions of our model are estimated
using robust standard errors adjusted for intra-group correlation. As can be seen, there
is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the contribution chosen
by the remaining members of the group in the previous round and the dependent vari-
able. This confirms that individual contribution to the negative externality is affected
by the behavior adopted by the rest of the group in the past. Likewise, the difference
between the contribution selected and the group average in the previous round con-
tributes significantly to explaining the variation experienced in the dependent variable.
In particular, our estimates indicate that AA and BA exert a positive and negative ef-
fect, respectively, on individual contribution. That is, the higher the difference with the
average from above, the greater the individual contribution to the negative externality.
Likewise, the higher the difference with the average from below, the lower the individual
contribution. This seems to show the lack of a convergence process toward the average
in this context.
Table 5 also reveals that the coefficient of the dummy variable used to identify
the Nash players is positive and statistically significant in all cases. This means that
those subjects classified in this category in the conditional setting are characterized
by choosing a significantly higher contribution, which is consistent with the information
provided by Figure 4. In turn, the coefficient of the dummy variable for the social players
is negative in all cases, although it is only statistically significant when the land is private
property. The type of treatment is also important when determining the impact on the
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Table 5: Determinants of individual contribution: Random effects model.
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 4.065*** 4.678*** 1.974
(1.259) (1.715) (1.838)
Contribution of the rest (t-1) 0.207*** 0.196*** 0.218***
(0.024) (0.034) (0.034)
Above average contribution (t-1) 0.792*** 0.710*** 0.884***
(0.102) (0.132) (0.138)
Below average contribution (t-1) -0.444*** -0.508*** -0.306***
(0.108) (0.169) (0.113)
Nash players 3.073*** 2.668*** 5.117***
(0.668) (0.523) (0.534)
Social players -2.362 -1.243*** -1.569
(2.063) (0.363) (3.391)
Conditional players 0.733 -0.282 2.988***
(1.171) (1.923) (0.649)
Common land 0.146
(0.606)
Round 2 -0.886 0.598 -2.563***
(0.789) (0.975) (0.927)
Round 3 -0.775 -0.457 -1.016
(0.538) (0.568) (0.804)
Round 4 -0.309 -0.491 0.067
(0.639) (0.991) (0.797)
Round 5 -0.701 0.488 -1.961
(0.849) (0.649) (1.579)
Round 6 0.070 0.532 -0.529
(0.815) (1.250) (1.026)
Round 7 0.527 1.180 -0.386
(0.755) (1.020) (1.149)
Round 8 -0.285 0.177 -0.792
(0.741) (0.729) (1.422)
Round 9 0.496 1.102 -0.073
(0.914) (1.022) (1.505)
Treatment Private Private Common
and common land land
R-squared overall 0.415 0.384 0.471
Number of subject 60 32 28
Groups 15 8 7
Observations 540 288 252
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10% level, ** significant
at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
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individual contributions of conditional players, whose positive effect on the dependent
variable is statistically significant only when the the land is common property. Overall
the results in Table 5 again confirm the heterogeneity of the subjects’ preferences in our
sample, and the relevance of the classification proposed in the previous section when
explaining the contribution decisions at the individual level.
Furthermore, the coefficient of the dummy variable used to distinguish between the
two treatments is not statistically significant, which indicates that there are no dif-
ferences between private and common land in terms of contribution to the negative
externality. Note that this result confirms our previous findings in Figure 2 and Ta-
ble 3. Finally, the signs of the coefficients of the time-specific effects included in the
model seem to suggest that contribution increases during the last rounds, which would
be consistent with our previous results. Nevertheless, this conclusion should be treated
with caution, as most of these coefficients are not statistically significant at conventional
levels.
Given the characteristics of the dependent variable, we now repeat the analysis
carried out above using a Tobit model that explicitly takes into account the lower and
upper limits of xjit. The results of this additional sensitivity check are presented in Table
6. As can be observed, our previous findings remain unaltered when this alternative
estimation approach is employed, thus reinforcing the robustness of the results in Table
5.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the impact of the definition of property rights on cropping
decisions when these decisions generate negative externalities. To that end, we have
developed an experimental study where agents make cropping decisions in two different
settings. In the first setting property rights are individually/privately defined (private
land treatment), whereas in the second setting property rights fall on a well-defined
community of users (common land treatment). In our analysis we have paid particular
attention to the potential influence on the results of the existence of differences in the
subjects’ preferences. For this reason, in both treatments cropping decisions are made in
two different contexts, a conditional context and a simultaneous context. In the former,
each agent knows the cropping decision of the rest before making her own decision. In
the latter, all agents make cropping decisions simultaneously and repeatedly, using only
the information provided by past cropping decisions.
The results show that there are no statistically significant differences between the
two treatments in the contribution to the negative externality, thus revealing that the
definition of property rights does not affect cropping decisions in this context. This
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Table 6: Determinants of individual contribution: Tobit model.
(1) (2) (3)
Constant -0.339 0.208 -0.626
(2.925) (3.125) (3.771)
Contribution of the rest (t-1) 0.335*** 0.310*** 0.342***
(0.057) (0.057) (0.092)
Above average contribution (t-1) 1.300*** 1.439*** 1.100***
(0.258) (0.235) (0.379)
Below average contribution (t-1) -0.740*** -0.715*** -0.690***
(0.159) (0.260) (0.206)
Nash players 8.336*** 6.444*** 14.782***
(1.654) (1.440) (1.835)
Social players -3.693 -1.366** -2.787
(3.607) (0.636) (6.491)
Conditional players 1.397 0.828 4.512***
(1.909) (2.906) (1.585)
Common land 1.257
(1.580)
Round 2 -1.647 0.797 -5.426***
(1.494) (1.999) (1.792)
Round 3 -1.357 -0.954 -2.761
(1.082) (0.804) (2.231)
Round 4 -0.894 -2.032 -0.074
(1.510) (2.286) (1.232)
Round 5 -1.033 0.662 -3.971
(1.774) (1.976) (3.224)
Round 6 0.206 0.738 -0.939
(1.703) (2.376) (2.574)
Round 7 1.336 2.153 -0.093
(1.608) (1.960) (2.802)
Round 8 -0.583 0.638 -2.472
(1.628) (1.372) (3.233)
Round 9 1.128 2.506 -1.029
(1.880) (2.080) (3.391)
Treatment Private Private Common
and common land land
Pseudo R-squared 0.117 0.101 0.147
Number of subject 60 32 28
Groups 15 8 7
Observations 540 288 252
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10% level, ** significant
at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
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suggests that privatization cannot be considered as a one-fits-all-solution to address the
problem of externalities in the exploitation of common property resources. Furthermore,
our findings indicate that the implication of the agents in activities generating negative
externalities tends to increase over time, thus amplifying its adverse consequences.
These results open new questions for future research. It is worth noting that, in
the private property analysis, we have considered that the land is distributed evenly
among the various landowners. However, in general, private property plots have varying
dimensions. In this situation, the negative externalities from crop decisions may be
non-assumable for small landholders; a fact that may be determinant in shaping agents’
behavior. It is also interesting to note that this paper develops a repeated experiment
to analyze cropping decisions. However, results may vary if the problem is analyzed
dynamically and losses in land value caused by negative externalities are extended to
the following periods. Focusing on common property, another question arises as to
what happens to cropping decisions if there is a community board that sets standards.
In this case, the key is the control and sanctions mechanisms implemented to ensure
compliance with these standards. The intervention of this community board may give
rise to important differences with the cropping decisions in private land.
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